In recent years radical right political parties have become a substantial electoral force in many countries around the world. Based on the vision of a mono-ethnic state, anti-immigration is these parties’ core message. Connecting research on discrimination, social exclusion, and social identity threat, it was assumed that this anti-immigrant propaganda undermines the intellectual performance of immigrant adolescents. In an experiment conducted at Austrian schools, the intelligence test performance of adolescents with an immigration background decreased after they were exposed to radical right election posters whereas ethnic majority adolescents remained unaffected. The results further suggest that individuals with a strong ethnic minority identity are less vulnerable to the detrimental impact of the radical right propaganda.

**KEY WORDS:** radical right political parties, immigration, intelligence, discrimination, social exclusion, stereotype threat, social identity threat

The political debate over immigration has a long history in the North America, and in recent decades immigration has become a much disputed topic in Europe and other world regions. Radical right political parties oppose new immigration, and they reject cultural diversity within a state (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). These “movements of exclusion” (Rydgren, 2005) opt for a culturally homogeneous state—often with substantial electoral success (e.g., 28.3% of the votes for two radical right parties in the 2008 national elections in Austria). The work described here indicates that the anti-immigrant propaganda of radical right political parties undermines the intellectual performance of adolescents with an immigration background, especially when their minority ethnic identity is weak.

**The Radical Right and Its Propaganda**

In the last 20 years, radical right parties have reemerged as an electoral force in Europe and in other stable democracies worldwide (Norris, 2005). Parties such as the *Front National* in France, *Vlaams Belang* in Belgium, or the *Danish People’s Party* have gained a double-digit percentage of the votes in national elections. The *Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)* and the *Lega Nord* in Italy have been part of the countries’ governing coalitions (Mudde, 2007). The political agenda of these parties is rooted in the concept of ethno-pluralism, which claims that in order to maintain the unique national characters of different peoples, they must be separated (Rydgren, 2007). According to this view, the mixing of different cultures and ethnicities leads to cultural extinction (Minkenberg, 1997). As a common feature, radical right parties oppose any signs of Muslim religious practice (e.g., minarets).
Immigrants from Muslim countries are described as a particular threat, because they supposedly lack compatibility with the national culture (Betz, 2006; Fennema, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). Radical right parties differ with regard to anti-Semitic sentiments. Whereas anti-Semitic statements have been observed for some radical right parties (e.g., Front National, FPÖ), radical right party leaders in other countries have emphasized a positive attitude towards the state of Israel and their countries’ Jewish citizens (e.g., Vlaams Belang; Mudde, 2007).

Anti-immigration is these parties’ core message and their unique selling point (van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). Immigrants are not only portrayed as a threat to the national identity, they are made responsible for crimes, for unemployment, and for the abuse of the social security system (Rydgren, 2007). Radical right political propaganda addresses the protection from future immigration. However, unlike more centrist political movements, radical right political propaganda emphasizes the exclusion of legal immigrants who already live in the country (Rydgren, 2005, 2007). Infamous election posters have depicted those with a nonmajority background as society’s black sheep who will be kicked out in order to regain security and prosperity (Swiss people’s party SVP; German extremist right party NPD).

Consequences on Immigrants’ Intellectual Performance: Discrimination and Social Exclusion Perspectives

Research has identified the characteristics of radical right parties in detail, including the push and pull factors that lead to their substantial electoral success (van der Brug & Fennema, 2007; see also Todosijevic & Enyedi, 2008). However, to date no empirical study has investigated the effects of this propaganda on the “black sheep,” i.e., the effects of radical right political propaganda on individuals with an immigration background. In this present work, the focus is on the impact of radical right propaganda on intelligent behavior—a key to participation in a society.

A simple evolutionary perspective may assume positive effects of radical right propaganda on immigrant intellectual functioning (cf. Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002; Twenge & Baumeister, 2005): When confronted with signs of antagonistic majority group members, intelligent behavior may have been critical for survival. Thus, humans may be inclined to change up to a higher gear in such situations and to excel cognitively. Following this perspective, radical right propaganda should increase the intellectual performance of immigrants.

However, opposing evolutionary considerations (cf. Baumeister et al., 2002; Twenge & Baumeister, 2005), as well as research on discrimination, social exclusion, and social identity threat, point at detrimental effects of radical right propaganda: The political communication of the radical right involves some form of exclusion and rejection, thus, findings from research on discrimination may apply here (cf. Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2009). This literature focused for the most part on women and/or African Americans under a health perspective. Discrimination (actual and perceived) is supposed to lead to a heightened stress response and maladaptive health risk behaviors, both factors that contribute to decreased mental and physical health (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009; Mays, Cochran, & Barnes, 2007). Although experimental data in support of the discrimination–risk behavior link is lacking, a few experiments tested the effect of discrimination on stress, yielding a small but significant effect (meta-analysis, $r = 0.11$; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009). If discrimination elevates stress levels, discrimination can be expected to impede the performance in cognitive tasks, at least when these tasks demand substantial working memory capacity (Kirschbaum, Wolf, May, & Wippich, 1996; Schoofs, Wolf, & Smeets, 2009).

Radical right propaganda may be regarded as a sign of social rejection of minority members. Social rejection was found to evoke aversive distress which involves physiological responses as well as cognitive and emotional appraisal and regulation processes which consume resources that are unavailable for information processing (Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004;
Mays et al., 2007). In one series of experiments that investigated cognitive performance (Baumeister et al., 2002) people performed worse after they learned that they were likely to end up alone in life. The prospect of social exclusion had detrimental effects on individuals’ achievement in complex cognitive tasks.

Taken together, both lines of research point to the negative impact of radical right propaganda on the cognitive functioning of people with an immigrant background. However, neither the discrimination nor the social exclusion approach has directly addressed the impact of political communication on behavior, and in neither of the two fields has intellectual performance been a dominant dependent variable.

*The Social Identity Threat Perspective*

Related research has been conducted within the social identity threat framework (Aronson & McGlone, 2009; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Social identity threat is conceived as a state of psychological discomfort that is thought to arise when individuals are confronted with an evaluative situation, in which one’s group is associated with a negative stereotype (stereotype threat), or more generally, the setting implies animosity towards one’s group or low group status (social identity threat, cf. Aronson & McGlone, 2009; Steele et al., 2002). Similar to the social exclusion research outlined above, a physiological stress response in combination with increased vigilance to one’s performance and the suppression of negative emotions has been found to reduce situational working memory capacity which in turn impairs performance in demanding cognitive tasks (e.g., Appel, Kronberger, & Aronson, 2011; see Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008, for an integrative process model). Most research on stereotype threat and social identity threat focused on women in math and science tests and African Americans in tests of general intellectual ability. Stereotype threat and immigration, though, has received much less attention (cf. Nguyen & Ryan, 2008). Deaux and colleagues (2007) conducted a study on Afro-Caribbean immigrants to the United States. They found that second-generation students showed the performance-decrement patterns of African American students under stereotype threat whereas first-generation students did not, possibly due to more positive stereotypes towards Caribbean than towards African Americans. As these authors indicate, their results may be specific to Afro-Caribbean immigration to the United States, because melting to the majority society brings about the specific ability stereotypes of African Americans. The only study that investigated cognitive performance under stereotype threat in a European sample of immigrants (Wicherts, Dolan, & Hessen, 2005) showed mixed results: Stereotype threat had no effect on the average intellectual performance score of Dutch adolescents with an immigration background. However, tests of measurement invariance suggested that the supposedly threatened group’s scores in the most difficult subtest were unrelated to a latent intelligence factor, indicating increased measurement error under stereotype threat.¹

In sum, research on the threat experience of immigrants is sparse, and the impact of political communication on behavior has never been addressed under a social identity threat perspective. We assume that radical right political propaganda qualifies as a source of social identity threat due its anti-immigrant content (e.g., Rydgren, 2007; van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). As a consequence, immigrants are supposed to show a performance decrease after being exposed to these messages, whereas majority members’ performance should remain unaffected or even be slightly elevated (Aronson & McGlone, 2009; Steele et al., 2002; Walton & Cohen, 2003).

¹ A further study investigated the effects of stereotype threat on African American soldiers who lived on a NATO base in Italy (Cadinu, Maass, Frigerio, Impagliazzo, & Latinotti, 2003, Experiment 2). Although these participants might be considered immigrants under certain perspectives, the experiment focused on their African American (as compared to European American) identity rather than their immigrant background in Italy, the location of their NATO base.
The Role of Ethnic Identity Strength

Individual differences in ethnic identity, i.e., the feeling of belongingness, shared values, and commitment to one’s ethnic group (Phinney, 1990), was identified by some scholars as a factor that buffers the negative impact of discrimination, social rejection, and social identity threat (e.g., Greene, Way, & Pahl, 2006; Oyserman, Harrison, & Bybee, 2001; Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder, 2001). In contrast, other scholars found that strong identity amplifies distress resulting from discrimination (e.g., Eliezer, Major, & Mendes, 2010; Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietzak, 2002; Yoo & Lee, 2008) or from stereotype threat (Schmader, 2002). We assume that these diverging results are due to the different roles of ethnic identity in these studies. According to Sellers and colleagues (Sellers, Copeland-Linder, Martin, & Lewis, 2006; Sellers & Shelton, 2003), ethnic identity is associated with a greater sensitivity towards stimuli in terms of perceived rejection and discrimination. However, the connection between perceived rejection and distress is attenuated for individuals with a strong ethnic identity because the sense of belongingness to the minority group may function as a source of personal strength and positive self-evaluation (e.g., Phinney et al., 2001). The propaganda of radical right parties delivers a clear anti-immigrant message even for those who are rather insensitive with regard to potentially discriminatory events. As a result, when confronted with anti-immigrant propaganda, the main role of ethnic identity should be that of a resource that attenuates its negative impact.

Aims of the Present Study

The main aim of the present study was to investigate the consequences of radical right political propaganda on immigrants. We believed that this would inform and extend theory and research on discrimination, social exclusion, and social identity threat. Anti-immigrant political propaganda by a radical right party was expected to impair the intellectual performance of adolescents with an immigrant background whereas no such effect was expected for adolescents with a majority background or when neutral political ads were presented. Moreover, theory and research outlined identity strength as a moderator of related effects; however, previous results had been inconsistent. Hence, the second aim was to provide additional evidence on the moderating role of ethnic identity strength. Under conditions of a clear anti-immigrant message, the impact of anti-immigrant propaganda should be most pronounced for immigrants with a weak identity regarding their minority ethnicity.

Method

Participants

Ethnically mixed groups of 16–28 students of secondary schools in Austria participated in their classrooms. Due to the anti-Islamic stimulus material in one condition (see below), adolescents who self-identified as members of a national group with a recent civil war that involved Muslims as opponents were excluded from further analyses. This applied to four Serbian students. One student did not follow instructions. Of the remaining sample of 94 adolescents, 49 (52%) indicated an immigrant identity; most frequent were Albanian (n = 8), Kosovan (n = 7), and Turkish identity (n = 7). Participants were between ages 13 to 17 (mean age = 14.6 years, SD = 1.1). Forty-six were female (49%).

Procedure, Material, and Design

First, the participants worked on a nonverbal measure of fluid intelligence (CFT-20, sections 1 and 2, Weiss [1998], parallel form A or form B was administered by random choice in order to
participants. The intellectual performance tended to decrease from our first to our second point of measurement, 

\[ F(1, 90) = 3.0, p = .09, \eta_p^2 = .03 \].

When the two-way interactions were inspected, changes from T1 to T2 were neither influenced by the adolescents’ ethnic background alone, 

\[ F(1, 90) < 1, p = .98, \eta_p^2 = .00 \], nor by the political ads that were presented between both intelligence measures, 

\[ F(1, 90) = 1.2, p = .28, \eta_p^2 = .01 \].

Our main hypothesis addressed the interplay of background and propaganda. As expected, a significant three-way interaction was found, 

\[ F(1, 90) = 4.2, p = .04, \eta_p^2 = .04 \] (Figure 1). Simple main effects indicate that adolescents with an immigrant background who were exposed to the

2 Although the items are comprehensible for both, majority- and minority-group members, the connotation of the behaviors is different for both groups (e.g., in Central Europe, majority members may be active in a social organization that includes mostly members of the majority group because the group composition reflects the ethnic composition of the residential area; this is less likely for minority-group members). Thus, only the data of ethnic minority-group members were analyzed.
anti-immigration ads performed worse on the intelligence test after exposure ($M = 59.24$, $SE_M = 3.59$) than before ($M = 65.22$, $SE_M = 3.18$), $F(1, 90) = 5.8$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2_p = .06$. No such performance drop occurred when adolescents with an immigration background were exposed to the neutral ads (before exposure: $M = 57.85$, $SE_M = 4.13$, after exposure: $M = 59.62$, $SE_M = 3.13$), $F(1, 90) < 1$, $p = .45$, $\eta^2_p = .00$. Likewise, the intellectual performance of nonimmigrants remained stable when exposed to the anti-immigration ads (before: $M = 72.33$, $SE_M = 2.76$, after: $M = 71.33$, $SE_M = 2.52$), $F(1, 90) < 1$, $p = .68$, $\eta^2_p = .00$, or when exposed to the neutral ads (before: $M = 72.71$, $SE_M = 2.94$, after: $M = 69.38$, $SE_M = 3.22$), $F(1, 90) = 1.6$, $p = .21$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. In sum, this pattern of results supports our assumption that anti-immigrant propaganda of the radical right impedes the intellectual performance of adolescents with an immigration background.

**Ethnic Identity**

Next, we tested the influence of the immigrants’ ethnic identity strength. We first conducted a moderated regression analysis with intellectual performance as the criterion (% correct after treatment minus % correct before treatment) and the political ads (anti-immigrant = -1, neutral = 1), and the strength of ethnic identity measure (continuous, $z$-standardized) as predictors. Identity had a trend-significant positive main effect on the performance score ($B = 3.41$, $SE_B = 1.77$, $\beta = .26$, $p = .06$, $\Delta R^2 = .07$). We assumed that ethnic identity played a particularly large role in the social identity threat condition; however, the treatment*identity interaction failed to reach statistical significance ($B = 2.15$, $SE_B = 1.77$, $\beta = .17$, $p = .23$, $\Delta R^2 = .03$). This nonsignificant interaction was unexpected. However, the simple slopes were in line with our assumptions (see Figure 2). The influence of identity appears to be stronger (and significant) in the group that was confronted with the anti-immigrant message ($B = 5.56$, $SE_B = 2.65$, $\beta = .43$, $p < .05$, $\Delta R^2 = .08$) than for the control group ($B = 1.26$, $SE_B = 2.35$, $\beta = .10$, $p = .59$, $\Delta R^2 = .01$).

In addition, we estimated the difference between the anti-immigrant ad and the neutral ad for participants who reported a high degree of ethnic identity (one standard deviation above the sample mean) and participants who reported a low degree of ethnic identity (one standard deviation below the sample mean). In these comparisons, the impact of the political ads occurred only in participants who reported a low degree of ethnic identity ($B = -5.72$, $SE_B = 2.47$, $\beta = -.45$, $p = .03$, $\Delta R^2 = .10$) but...
Discussion

Anti-immigration is the core message of radical right political parties. This is the first study to show short-term detrimental effects of anti-immigrant propaganda on immigrant intellectual performance. Due to the constant prevalence of anti-immigrant messages in many countries, the short-term effect reported here is supposed to result in long-term effects that may involve a disidentification with complex cognitive tasks and school in general (cf. Steele et al., 2002). In many countries worldwide, second- and third-generation immigrants show poor academic performance which is a major source of concern regarding the participation prospects of immigrants (OECD, 2009). The work described here indicates that the anti-immigrant propaganda of radical right political parties may contribute to the performance deficit of immigrant youth. If, as we suppose, radical right political propaganda signals the prospect of social exclusion, its impact on immigrant health, aggression, prosocial behavior, and self-defeating behavior deserves future attention (cf. Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006; Mays et al., 2007; Twenge & Baumeister, 2005; cf. Inzlicht & Kang, 2010). Knowledge about the detrimental effects of anti-immigrant propaganda may help educators and counselors in their aims at achieving equality in adolescent education (Johns, Schmader, & Martens, 2005; Yakushko, 2009), and it may inform legislators who deal with radical right and extremist right political movements.

Radical right political propaganda is only one of many possible situations in which animosity towards an immigrant’s group, low group status or negative ability stereotypes are communicated. Whenever such a situation occurs, social identity threat is supposed to impede the cognitive performance of immigrants. This is the first study to show the detrimental effects of social identity threat on immigrants in Europe. Thus, more research is needed which may ultimately illuminate ways to reduce the damaging effects of negative stereotypes, discrimination, and social exclusion. Existing theory and research that is based on issues of gender and race already provide a rich knowledge base regarding the processes, boundary conditions, and remedies of social identity threat (e.g., Aronson & McGlone, 2009; Schmader et al., 2008; Steele et al., 2002). However, when applied to the experience and behavior of immigrants in Europe (or other regions outside the United States), one

Figure 2. Simple slope estimates of the effect of ethnic identity strength in the group that was confronted with the anti-immigrant ads and in the neutral ads group. Adolescents with immigration background only, n = 49 (note: *p < .05).
may consider variations in stereotype content (cf. Deaux et al., 2007) and variables such as identity strength may play a different role.

Indeed, we found partial support for our assumption that minority ethnic identity buffers the detrimental effect of radical right messages. This result is consistent with models that suggest that a strong social identity protects individuals from the negative effects of a stimulus that is likely perceived as a stressor by a large part of group members (e.g., Haslam, O’Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna, 2005). At the same time, this result seems to be at odds with theory and findings from the stereotype threat literature that found a positive relationship between identity strength and stereotype threat effects (Schmader, 2002; see also Ho & Sidanius, 2010). Given that the present study is limited with regard to evidence for processes that mediated the moderating influence of ethnic identity strength, additional thoughts on these processes seem warranted.

As outlined by Steele and colleagues, social identity threat can be triggered by a range of situational cues that signal animosity or low group status (Steele et al., 2002). Such sources of social identity threat can be rather subtle, such as insensitive communication or the prospect of an unstructured and subjective evaluation. However, such sources of social identity threat can also be explicit signs of social rejection such as the radical right political propaganda examined in the present study. We assume that the role of identity strength varies, depending on the explicitness of the situational cue. Following a recent process model on stereotype threat, social identity threat leads to a physiological stress response, increased performance vigilance, and the suppression of negative emotions. All three factors reduce situational working memory capacity and therefore cognitive performance (Schmader et al., 2008). It is important to note that the three mediating variables are influenced by appraisal processes. Individuals who reappraise the situation as less threatening show smaller decrements in working memory capacity and performance (Johns, Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008). We think that a strong ethnic identity, introduced here as the feeling of belongingness, shared values, and commitment to one’s ethnic group (Phinney, 1990), contributes to the perceived ability to cope with social identity threat. The close bonds with other ethnic group members are supposed to provide a sense of social support that leads to more positive reappraisals of the stressful situation (Haslam et al., 2005). As a consequence of more positive reappraisals, individuals with a strong ethnic identity should be less affected by social identity threat—a relationship that found tentative support in the present study. This result is in line with research that points at a more effective coping of stressful discriminatory events among individuals with high ethnic identity scores (e.g., Mossakowski, 2003; Phinney & Chavira, 1995; Ting-Toomey et al., 2000).

Under different circumstances, however, individuals with a strong ethnic identity can be more affected by social identity threat than individuals with a weak ethnic identity. A number of studies showed that individuals who are more identified with their group are more likely to attribute negative incidents to discrimination (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). When confronted with a confederate whose behavior was prejudiced in a subtle manner, only highly identified individuals expressed suspicion about this person (Operario & Fiske, 2001). Thus, whenever situational cues are subtle and may or may not be threat-inducing, identity strength can have a detrimental impact on performance by increasing the likelihood of the threat experience in the first place.

Following this rationale, the pattern of results concerning identity strength observed in the present study is supposed to disappear when a political statement on immigration is more ambivalent than the clear-cut anti-immigrant message found on the election posters of radical right political parties. In that case weakly identified individuals should less likely interpret the message as a sign of discrimination and rejection which makes them less vulnerable to potential detrimental effects (cf. Sellers & Shelton, 2003).

Finally, the measurement of identity strength needs to be noted as a limitation of the present study. We found no relationship between our treatment and immigrant identity scores; however,
future research may wish to assess identity more independently. Second, we employed the Multi-
group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) which does not allow for a fine-grained analysis of distinct
identity strength-dimensions (Phinney, 1992). Future research is encouraged to distinguish different
dimensions of immigrant ethnic identity which may vary in their relationship to the experience and
the effects of social identity threat. Third, we suspect that measures on belongingness and commit-
tment to the majority society (national identity, e.g., Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006) may
provide additional information to help identify those who are most vulnerable to the anti-immigrant
rhetoric of radical political parties.

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